COVID-19 contact tracing: The tricky balance between privacy and relief efforts

For any of these apps to be useful, there has to be widespread take-up. If more than 2 billion devices are unable to run the apps being developed that means an even higher take-up rate is required. If the technorati can’t gain the trust of most users, then these projects will fail. I see two versions of app being developed. The first creates a central database of all person-person interactions for later querying; the second holds all data on an individual’s device until they voluntarily make it available. I know which I feel more comfortable with…:

[…] The Director of the University of Western Australia Centre for Software and Security Practice, David Glance, took a different perspective, telling TechRepublic that while it was reassuring to see the CSCRC and DTA perform security tests on Australia’s contact tracing app, there will always be privacy concerns due to the role health authorities have in collecting and using the information gathered.

“You’ve got to trust the implementation of infrastructure performed by the health authorities, which I don’t. They’re notoriously bad at running infrastructure, especially for something like this. And so, I think that’s the fundamental problem,” Glance said.

Previous data projects created by Australia’s health authorities, like My Health Record, have been lambasted for having a lack of security measures.


Read the original article here